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Model-based Systems Engineering (MBSE) provides features for behavioral 
analysis, requirements traceability, system architecture, simulation, testing, and 
performance analysis that are imperative for the testing of safety-critical systems. In this 
report, we present a case study of a simple safety-critical system, and model the system 
using UML (Unified Modeling Language), SysML (Systems Modeling Language), and 
AADL (Architecture Analysis and Design Language). We then extend the AADL model 
with user-defined properties and annexes to augment additional analysis and reporting 
capabilities relevant to safety-critical systems. As safety and security expectations grow 
in concert with system complexity, MBSE will become increasingly ingrained in the 
workflow of the systems and software engineering communities. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The typical system/software development life cycle (SDLC) consists of six stages: 
planning, analysis, design, implementation, integration/testing, and support/maintenance. 
In a waterfall-based SDLC, these stages are performed sequentially, with only one pass 
during the lifetime of a specific release of a product. In an iterative / agile-based SDLC, 
on the other hand, these stages are performed sequentially, many times during the 
lifetime of a specific release of a product, often in scheduled increments known as 
sprints.  
A waterfall-based SDLC tends to be used more in the creation of safety-critical 
systems due to the rigor of analysis and testing requirements requisite for safety 
certification. Errors in analysis and design in the waterfall-based SDLC that are detected 
during the integration/testing phase tend to be more costly in monetary and scheduling 
terms than the more forgiving iterative / agile-based SDL, where errors can be detected 
and mitigated rapidly during subsequent product sprints. 
 Irrespective of the flavor of SDLC incorporated by an organization, after 
requirements are accepted and before an engineer begins implementing a system, 
modeling languages are often used during the design phase to document a system’s 
architecture. The creation of modeling language-based artifacts is analogous to the 
creation of blueprints during the design phase used in manufacturing processes. 
UML (Unified Modeling Language), created by Grady Booch, Ivar Jacobson, and 
James Rumbaugh at Rational Software in the early to mid-1990s, is a general-purpose 
visual modeling language that is used to specify, visualize, construct, and document the 
artifacts of a software system (Rumbaugh et al., 2005). 
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UML provides structural diagrams that emphasize entities that must be present in 
a system, behavior diagrams that emphasize what must occur in a system, interaction 
diagrams that emphasize data and control flow amongst the things in the system, and 
implementation diagrams that show the structure of the run-time system. 
Whereas the domain of the software engineer is in the implementation phase, the 
domain of the systems engineer is in the analysis and integration/testing phase. MBSE 
(Model-based systems engineering) extends modeling languages, such as UML, to make 
them useful within the domains of systems engineering. MBSE is expected to replace the 
document-centric approach that has been practiced by systems engineers in the past and 
to influence the future practice of systems engineering by being fully integrated into the 
definition of systems engineering processes (INCOSE, 2007). Due to integration/testing 
issues having higher cost in a waterfall-based SDLC, MBSE focuses on virtual 
integration. From the MBSE artifacts, systems engineers can integrate/test systems and 
perform analyses so that major architectural issues can be detected and mitigated before 
implementation begins. Two modeling languages that are enabling technologies for 
MBSE are SysML (Systems Modeling Language) and AADL (Architecture Analysis and 
Design Language). 
SysML is a graphical modeling language that can be used to visualize and 
communicate the designs of sociotechnical systems on all scales (Delligatti, 2014). It is 
used as an architecture modeling language for systems engineering applications, and was 
created by the SysML Partners’ SysML Open Source Specification Project in 2013. It 
was subsequently adapted and adopted by the Object Management Group (OMG) as 
OMG SysML in 2006. SysML is a superset of UML and supports the specification, 
analysis, design, and V&V of systems and systems of systems (SoS). 
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SysML introduces SysML extensions, namely: block definition diagrams (BDDs), 
which replaces the UML class diagrams, internal block diagrams (IBDs), that replaces the 
UML composite structure diagrams, requirements diagrams to document requirements, 
and parametric diagrams that permit the analysis of critical parameters. SysML-based 
tools such as Cameo Enterprise Architecture by Dassault Systèmes and Enterprise 
Architect by Sparx use SysML to allow simulation, testing, and requirements traceability 
of a system. 
AADL is an architecture description language standardized by SAE (Society of 
Automotive Engineering). It focuses on system design specification using rich, formal 
semantics that can be used to analyze and generate systems (Delange, 2017). The 
architecture can be used either for documentation, for analysis, or for code generation. Its 
purpose is V&V and has an underlying specification language.  It is more software-
oriented and provides type primitives that can capture processes, threads, and data. 
AADL was designed for MBSE and has notation for specification of runtime architecture 
of safety-critical and secure software intensive systems.  
Our goal in this report is to present a simple case study of a safety-critical system. 
We begin in the analysis phase, creating a Capability Requirements Specification (CRS) 
followed by a Software Requirements Specification (SRS). We start the design modeling 
process using UML and then step back to the analysis phase and show that the CRS and 
SRS could have been implemented in a modeling language as well—in this case SysML. 
We will integrate requirements and physical hardware specification to our system model.  
SysML is a higher-level modeling language in contrast to AADL. AADL allows 
lower-level modeling that is typically required of real-time systems. The primary work in 
this report is creating AADL user-defined properties and AADL annexes to augment the 
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capabilities of AADL for the design of real-time, safety-critical systems. We will perform 
a SWaP (Size, Weight, and Power) analysis on the internal components of a signal 
processing unit and perform security analysis by creating an attack tree to show possible 





















Chapter 2:  Case Study: Specifications and Initial UML Model 
Our case study will involve a safety-critical ADS-B (Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast) signal processing unit that will serve as our SUT (System Under 
Test). The signal processing unit is part of a greater SoS that serves a hypothetical 
customer’s analysis needs. 
 
Figure 1: Case Study: System of Systems (SoS) / Data Flow 
We will be using the traditional waterfall-based SDLC. Our focus within this case 
study is on the analysis stage. During the analysis phase, the customer-given capability 
requirements specification and engineering-derived software requirements specification 
are as follows: 
 
Requirement ID Requirement 
CRS-1 The signal processing unit shall operate within an environment where 
temperatures are within the range of 26°C to 50°C inclusive.  
CRS-2 The signal processing unit shall not exceed a width of 10cm. 
CRS-3 The signal processing unit shall not exceed a height of 25cm. 
CRS-4 The signal processing unit shall not exceed a depth of 20cm. 
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CRS-5 The signal processing unit’s internal components shall not exceed a weight 
of 2kg. 
CRS-6 The signal processing unit’s internal components shall not exceed a power 
of 300W. 
CRS-7 The signal processing unit shall transmit extracted ADS-B information over 
an existing network to an Analysis Display Processor. 
Table 1: Case Study: Capability Requirements Specification 
 
Requirement ID Requirement 
SRS-1 The signal processing unit shall not exceed a temperature of 27°C. (Links to 
CRS-1). 
SRS-2 The signal processing unit shall control redundant fans. (Links to CRS-1). 
SRS-3 The signal processing unit shall receive ADS-B at 1090MHz using mode-S 
extended squitter of the SSR transponder, with 50KHz of bandwidth. (Links 
to CRS-7). 
SRS-4 The signal processing unit shall receive ADS-B at 978MHz (UAT), with 
1.3MHz of bandwidth. (Links to CRS-7). 
SRS-5 The signal processing unit shall process ADS-B signals within an 8ms time 
window. (Links to CRS-7). 
SRS-6 The signal processing unit shall transmit extracted ADS-B information 
using the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) transport. (Links to CRS-7). 
Table 2: Case Study: Software Requirements Specification 
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 From the above SRS, the traditional next step in our analytical progression is to 
model the software using a modeling language. We will begin using UML, noting some 
pitfalls with respect to serving the needs of the systems engineering organization with 
discussion of how additional modeling languages, such as SysML and AADL can be used 
to mitigate these pitfalls. 
We will create the following diagrams: (1) Signal Processing Unit Use Case 
Diagram, (2) Signal Processing Unit Class Diagram, (3) Maintain Temperature Sequence 
Diagram, (4) Maintain Temperature Activity Diagram, (5) Process Signal Sequence 
Diagram, and (6) Process Signal Activity Diagram. 
A use case diagram represents a user’s or system’s interaction with the system at a 
high-level. For our case study, we have an actor named System Manager that interacts 






Figure 2: Case Study: Signal Processing Unit UML Use Case Diagram 
We also make a signal processing unit class diagram. We have three classes: 
SystemManager, TemperatureMaintainer, and SignalProcessor. The SystemManager 





Figure 3: Case Study: Signal Processing Unit UML Class Diagram 
 The following sequence diagram shows the call flow from the System Manager 
actor for maintaining temperature. 
 
 
Figure 4: Case Study: Maintain Temperature UML Sequence Diagram 
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The following activity diagram shows the actions of the TemperatureMaintainer 
connected by control flows that indicate the sequence in which actions are fired. Our 
specification states that the temperature must be maintained to be less than or equal to 
27°C. Based on our analysis, as long as a single fan is at the following capacities for the 
respective temperature ranges, we will be able to meet the set point per the specification. 
Two fans are controlled and utilized in case one fan fails. 
 
 
Figure 5: Case Study: Maintain Temperature UML Activity Diagram 
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The following sequence diagram shows the call flow from the System Manager actor for 
processing ADS-B signals. 
 
 













The following activity diagram shows the actions of the SignalProcessor 
connected by control flows that indicate the sequence in which actions are fired. Our 




Figure 7: Case Study: Process Signal UML Activity Diagram 
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We have produced UML models that will be helpful for software engineers during 
the implementation phase; however, there are relevant systems engineering details not 
representable with UML. What are the constituent hardware components? What are the 




















Chapter 3:  Case Study: SysML Model 
In the previous chapter, we created a simple UML model to model the software 
for the signal processing unit. We will now look how we could have augmented these 
software models with SysML models to address systems engineering activities during the 
analysis phase. We will create the following SysML diagrams: (1) Signal Processing Unit 
SysML Requirements Diagram, and (2) Signal Processing Unit SysML Block Definition 
Diagram. All the diagrams created in the previous chapter are valid SysML as well. We 
will not repeat them again in this chapter. 
SysML provides a requirements diagram that can be used for capturing 
requirements within a system model. Capturing requirements in a system model in 
contrast to keeping requirements in a separate system has several benefits. The three most 
prominent benefits are that (1) requirements can easily be traced to design-level artifacts, 
(2) requirements do not get out of synchronization with design, and (3) requirements 
within the system model can still be exported to traditional document artifacts as 
necessary. We will take the original document-based CRS and SRS requirements from 
the previous chapter and place them in our system model. SRS requirements will be 
requirement entities that are associated to CRS requirements through a derive 
relationship. This allows the systems engineer to observe CRS and SRS requirements 
within the same model without having to trace through cumbersome links in traditional 
systems engineering tools. 
SysML environments provide a way to trace requirements down to design-level 
artifacts and provide checklist functionality and completion analysis that are useful for 




The requirements diagram is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 8: Case Study: Signal Processing Unit SysML Requirements Diagram 
 BDDs (Block Definition Diagrams) replace UML class diagrams in SysML. 
BDDs represent a system component such as software or hardware. In our case study, we 
will use a BDD to represent the physical hardware of the signal processing unit. We 
represent our system as well as its constituent parts as blocks. The parts that make up the 
system are represented with composition notations. We also utilize proxy ports to model 
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the interfaces with the external boundary of our system. Proxy ports differ from full ports 
in that they are not fully realized—this permits binding of realized physical ports later on 
in the analysis process (i.e. if use of a copper-based vs. fiber-based network medium has 
not yet been established). 
 The BDD for the signal processing unit is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 9: Case Study: Signal Processing Unit SysML BDD 
 
We have seen that SysML, a superset of UML, allows modeling of systems 
engineering activities in a common way to the modeling of software by software 
engineers. Systems and software engineers can use the models jointly during the various 
phases of the SDLC. What can we do about lower-level requirements, such as timing 
requirements? In the next chapter, we will look at using AADL for this type of analysis. 
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Chapter 4:  Case Study: AADL Model 
We have a requirement specified in our SysML requirements diagram, identified 
as SRS-5, that states the signal processing unit shall process ADS-B signals within an 
8ms time window. AADL is an architecture and analysis design language created for 
modeling real-time systems. It is best suited for modeling processors, memory, processes, 
and threads; consequently, it is the ideal modeling language to use for this requirement. 
We will use an open source IDE called OSATE that is based on Eclipse for our 
development of our AADL model. 
In a similar way to modeling our signal processing unit as a SysML BDD in the 
previous chapter, AADL allows us to define devices for our system. 
The devices.aadl file containing the devices package is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 10: Case Study: AADL devices.aadl 
We also create a system implementation that associates instances to these devices. 
This system implementation represents an instantiable model that can be analyzed. For 
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SRS-5, we are specifically interested in performing a latency analysis of the 
SignalProcessor process data flows.  
 
The system implementation is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 11: Case Study: AADL integration.aadl 
The subcomponents of the integration package contain the devices that were 
represented in our signal processing unit SysML BDD. We also added a SignalProcessor 
process implementation. This process has three threads: ReceiveSignalThread, 
ParseADSBThread, and SendADSBInfoToAnalysisDataProcessorThread. The 
SignalProcessor receives signal information as 112 bits of raw data and outputs a 
formatted ADS-B message that is 1KiB in size. We specify the individual thread latency 




The AADL definitions of the SignalProcessor process is as follows: 
 
 
















Figure 14: Case Study: AADL SignalProcessor definitions (with latencies) 
 
We use the OSATE analysis tools to perform a latency analysis of the signal 




Figure 15: Case Study: AADL Latency Analysis Report 
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We can see from the latency report that based on our empirical timings for each 
thread in the SignalProcessor process, the minimum latency is 3ms; whereas, the 
maximum latency is 8ms; hence, the SignalProcessor process is in compliance with the 
SRS-5 requirement. 
OSATE provides many analysis tools, including fault tree, bus load, and 
scheduling analysis. In the next chapter, we will look at implementing additional tools for 
OSATE, namely a SWaP Analysis Report tool and a security tool for generating attack 































Chapter 5:  Extending AADL for Safety Analysis 
AADL models can be extended beyond the core AADL language by use of user-
defined properties and annexes. User-defined properties can be specified directly within 
the core AADL language, while annexes are more complex and require custom language 
parser implementation. We will use both types of AADL extensions with respect to our 
case study. All source code for these extensions can be found at 
https://github.com/jasontrout/AADL_extensions.  
AADL USER-DEFINED PROPERTIES FOR GENERATING  A SWAP ANALYSIS REPORT 
Embedded computing manufacturers often strive to reduce SWaP with the goal of 
creating performant systems with minimal resource footprint. For safety-critical systems, 
violating SWaP requirements can result in system instability and general vulnerability. 
When performing an architectural analysis, it is imperative that we can perform trades 
amongst subcomponents with respect to SWaP easily and accurately. The user-defined 
properties functionality of AADL provides a means to achieve this goal. 
In our case study, we have the following requirements: (1) The signal processing 
unit shall not exceed a width of 10cm, (2) The signal processing unit shall not exceed a 
height of 25cm, (3) The signal processing unit shall not exceed a depth of 20cm, (4) The 
weight of the internal components of the signal processing unit shall not exceed 2kg, and 
(5) The power consumed by the internal components of the signal processing unit shall 
not exceed 300W. We will create a property set called swap_properties used exclusively 
for SWaP analysis. 





Figure 16: Case Study: AADL swap_properties.aadl 
The properties are defined in the swap_properties property set are width, height, 
depth, weight, and max_power. Each property is assigned a domain type that constrains 
the properties to a domain—in our case, to the real numbers. Also, a units type is 
optionally assigned to each property. This constrains the units that can be used for these 
properties as well as conversion factors amongst other permitted units. The ability to 
constrain properties to particular units values as well as provide conversion factors is 
convenient and prevents confusion that can occur when working with unitless numbers—
such as one engineer expecting units to be metric and another engineer expecting units to 
be imperial. 
Our devices file, devices.aadl, contains processor, memory, and device SWaP 
properties. We only include width, height, and depth properties to the signal processing 




Figure 17: Case Study: AADL devices.aadl with SWaP Properties 
 
 
Figure 18: Case Study: AADL integration.aadl Recapitulation 
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We will now create an OSATE plugin to create a SWaP Analysis Report. To 
create the plugin, we create an Eclipse plugin project. This project contains a file named 
plugin.xml that sets the SWaP Analysis Report menu option as well as its command 
binding. We then create a class named SwapAnalysisHandler that extends the abstract 
class org.eclipse.core.commands.AbstractHandler. This abstract class has a method 
named execute that is overridden and will be invoked when the SWaP Analysis Report 
command is initiated by the user. 




SwapAttributes Java Bean class that contains the constituent SWaP properties: weight, 
height, depth, and max power. 
execute Entry point method for the plugin. 
generateCsvReport Method to generate SWaP Analysis Report in a CSV (Comma 
Separated Value) format. 
getSwapAttributes Method to get the SWaP attributes for the specified property holder. 
getSwapProperty Method to get the SWaP property with the specified property name. 
getSwapPropertyValue Method to get the SWaP property value with the specified property 
name in the specified units. 
hasSwapProperties Method to determine if a property holder has SWaP properties. 
Table 3: Case Study: AADL SWaP Analysis Report Plugin Methods/Classes 




Figure 19: Case Study: AADL SWaP Analysis Report 
When gathering the SWaP properties, we were able to use an OSATE provided 
method PropertyUtils.getScaledNumberValue that permitted us to get property values in 
a specified unit irrespective of the units specified in the devices.aadl file. This allows us 
to compare SWaP properties more easily per our requirements specification. From the 
above report, we see that the dimensions of the signal processing unit chassis are 9cm x 
24cm x 19cm, the weight of the signal processing unit internal components is 
approximately 0.97kg, and the maximum power utilized by the signal processing unit 
internal components is approximately 254W. These SWaP attributes are all within the 
allowed range per our requirements specification. 
The development of the SWaP Analysis Report plugin demonstrates the power of 
user-defined properties in AADL and plugins in OSATE to perform analyses that are 
important for safety-critical systems. User-defined properties do not require changes to 
the core AADL language. We will now show how the core AADL can be extended with 
annex extensions. This will provide a means of providing more expressive syntactical 
structure to our model. 
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AADL ANNEX EXTENSION FOR GENERATING ATTACK TREES 
AADL annexes extend the core AADL language and require custom language 
parser implementation. Annexes are included within models using the annex keyword 
along with the custom annex specification language enclosed within {** and **} 
delimiters. 
Security is of paramount importance in the analysis and design of safety-critical 
systems. Attack trees, introduced by Bruce Schneier, are useful conceptual diagrams 
showing how an asset or target might be attacked. We will create an annex specification 
named security_specification that will allow us to enumerate device, processor, and 
memory dependencies in order to create and generate an attack tree that shows the 
potential paths for attacking our signal processing unit. 
BNF (Backus-Naur Form) notation is a formal mathematical way to describe a 
language and consists of a set of terminal symbols, a set of non-terminal symbols, and a 
set of production rules of the form (left hand side) := (right hand side). For our 
security_specification, we will use the following BNF: 
 
 
Figure 20: Case Study: AADL BNF for the security_specification annex 
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Figure 21: Case Study: AADL security_specification annex 
We implement an Attack Tree plugin in the same way as we implemented the 
SWaP Analysis Report plugin in the last section. For information pertaining to OSATE 
plugin creation and structure, please reference the SWaP Analysis Report section 
preceding this section. 
We parse the security_specification block, build an attack tree using a simple tree 
data structure, and then provide a means of generating a graphical report of the attack tree 







Methods and classes implemented for the Attack Tree command are as follows: 
 
Method/Class Description 
AttackTree Class representing the attack tree. 
execute Entry point method for the plugin. 
generateAttackTreeReport Method to generate report containing graphical representation of 
the attack tree. 
parseSpecification Method to parse the security_specification per the BNF. 
Table 4: Case Study: AADL Attack Tree Plugin Methods/Classes 




Figure 22: Case Study: AADL Attack Tree 
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This attack tree is simple. From any given directly exposable device, processor, or 
cpu within the system, the subsequent children nodes represent a chain of potential attack 
vectors. Please note in the generated tree that the edges have been omitted between 
vertices. Edges flow only vertically from the root node to the leaf node of each chain. 
We have demonstrated the flexibility that AADL and OSATE provide in 
augmenting additional reporting and analytical capabilities to models. There are many 
additional applications that could be created, for instance, for DO178C certifiability or 
FACE (Future Airborne Capability Environment) conformance requirements that are 


















Chapter 6:  Related Work 
OSATE is an open source platform for AADL and much work has been 
performed by the systems modeling community on extending the modeling language and 
modeling tools. We will briefly talk about projects that have been created within this 
space, namely: BLESS, a formal specification and verification of behaviors for embedded 
systems with software annex, architecture fault modeling with the AADL error-model 
annex, and the Cheddar plugin used for real-time scheduling analysis. 
BLESS is a Behavioral Interface Specification Language (BISL) and proof 
environment for AADL. It is implemented as an AADL annex and introduces notations 
for specifying behaviors on component interfaces, defining AADL runtime aware 
transition systems that capture the internal behavior of AADL components—[this is 
similar to Java Pathfinder (JPF), a model checker for Java bytecode created by NASA 
that is part of the Verification and Validation course at The University of Texas at 
Austin], and the ability to write assertions to capture important state and event properties 
within the transition system notation (Larson et al., 2013). 
The AADL error-model annex extends AADL to support architecture fault 
modeling and automated safety analysis. It provides a fault propagation ontology to 
support architecture fault models—focusing on fault propagation, failure behavior of 
individual components, and composite failure of a system in terms of its components 
(Delange et al., 2014). 
The Cheddar plugin, started in 2002 by Frank Singhoff, is a GPL real-time 
scheduling tool/simulator that allows one to model software architectures of real-time 
systems and to check schedulability and other performance criteria—the schedulability of 
real-time systems can be assessed by feasibility tests or simulations (Singhoff, 2019). 
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
In this report, we created and modeled a simple case study and focused on 
extending the reporting and analysis capabilities of AADL. OSATE currently supports 
code generation from real-time operating systems such as VxWorks, DeOS, and POK. 
While the focus of AADL and OSATE are on real-time systems, this modeling language 
and software could also be applied to non-real-time applications that run on consumer 
grade operating systems such as Microsoft Windows, macOS, and GNU/Linux.  
The creation of an AADL annex for the specification of unit and integration level 
testing would also be useful. The annex would allow specification of generated code 
coverage requirements (including node coverage, branch coverage, input coverage, and 
syntax-based coverage). 
While we focused on attack trees for security analysis in AADL, a more 
comprehensive security suite would be beneficial. Due to the popularity of IoT (Internet 
of Things) and CPSs (cyberphysical systems), security is of ever increasing importance in 
systems analysis and software design. 
FACE a standard that is becoming increasingly important to the avionics 
community. AADL extensions to support FACE data modeling and the auto-generation 
of FACE artifacts (Units of Conformance (UoC) and Units of Portability (UoP)) would 
be greatly beneficial to the avionics community. 
Synchronization of AADL models and software running within a distributed 
environment would be of greatly beneficial to DevOps teams. This would allow 
specification of desired runtime functionality and subsequent monitoring of actual 
software runtime behavior to validate that systems are functioning per the specifications 
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